Now contrast the above with clauses that slam the courthouse doors everywhere except the chosen forum. Florida courts love pointing out these clear mandatory clauses. Take Ware Else, Inc. v. Ofstein, 856 So. 2d 1079 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003) for example. The contract in that case said any litigation “shall have its venue located exclusively in Missouri.” The inclusion of “exclusively” was a dead giveaway; the Fifth DCA had no trouble calling it a mandatory clause, meaning the parties were bound to litigate in Missouri and nowhere else. If you agreed to Missouri BBQ and courtrooms in your contract, then Missouri it shall be.
Here’s an interesting twist: you don’t always need a magic word like “exclusively” or “only” to create a mandatory clause in Florida. Courts will read the clause as a whole to discern exclusivity, even from context or grammar. For example, in Golf Scoring Sys. Unlimited, Inc. v. Remedio, 877 So. 2d 827 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004), the contract stated that “the parties consent to Broward County, Florida, as the proper venue for all actions that may be brought.” It didn’t explicitly say “only Broward,” no “only” or “exclusive” appeared. Even so, the Fourth DCA held that this was a mandatory clause.
Why? The court homed in on the phrasing “the proper venue for all actions,” emphasizing the definite article “the.” By stating that Broward County is the proper venue for all lawsuits, the clause implied that no other venue would be suitable. Essentially, the court read it as “Broward County is the place, and no other place.”
A tiny three-letter word, “the,” carried a big punch, implicitly excluding other forums.
Florida’s Third District Court of Appeal underscored in a 2017 case that there are “no magic words” absolutely required to make a clause mandatory; the real test is whether the parties intended exclusivity, evaluated in context.
For example, one clause examined by the Third DCA stated that a purchase agreement “shall be deemed entered into and performed in California.” The buyer consented to the enforcement of the contract in California courts. It never flat-out said “only California,” but the court reasoned that allowing the lawsuit to proceed in Florida would “render meaningless” the contractual statement that the deal was performed in California.
In other words, the clause clearly pointed to California as the expected forum, even if it didn’t use the word “exclusive.” The Third DCA declared the clause mandatory and promptly dismissed the case from Florida. The parties had effectively committed to California as the exclusive forum by the contract’s intent. The lesson: Florida judges won’t ignore obvious intent. If a contract clearly points to one forum as the locus of all disputes, a judge won’t play dumb and pretend it’s permissive just because the clause lacks a particular talismanic word. Intent supersedes formalism.
For a crystal-clear example, look at World Vacation Travel v. Brooker, 799 So. 2d 410 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001). The clause there provided that both parties agree to the jurisdiction of the courts of Cancún, Mexico, “…forsaking any other jurisdiction.” Unsurprisingly, the Third DCA found that to be a mandatory exclusive forum clause. By agreeing to “forsake” all other jurisdictions, the parties said adiós to every court except those in Cancún.
If nothing else, a mandatory forum clause like that might at least get you a trip to Cancún for litigation.
Suppose your contract’s forum clause uses exclusive language, even subtly, like saying a particular place is the venue for all disputes. In that case, Florida courts will treat it as mandatory and require disputes to be heard in that forum. If it merely says the parties “may” litigate somewhere or submits to a certain jurisdiction without excluding others, it’s permissive. Meaning a lawsuit can still be heard in a different proper forum despite the clause. Florida’s case law makes this distinction abundantly clear, time and again.